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Education and Research Integration of Emerging Multidisciplinary Medical
Devices Security
Abstract
Traditional embedded systems such as secure smart cards and nano-sensor networks have been
utilized in various usage models. Nevertheless, emerging secure deeply-embedded systems, e.g.,
implantable and wearable medical devices, have comparably larger “attack surface”.
Specifically, with respect to medical devices, a security breach can be life-threatening (for which
adopting traditional solutions might not be practical due to tight constraints of these oftenbattery-powered systems), and unlike traditional embedded systems, it is not only a matter of
financial loss. Unfortunately, although emerging cryptographic engineering research mechanisms
for such deeply-embedded systems have started solving this critical, vital problem, university
education (at both graduate and undergraduate level) lags comparably. One of the pivotal reasons
for such a lag is the multi-disciplinary nature of the emerging security bottlenecks. Based on the
aforementioned motivation, in this work, at Rochester Institute of Technology, we present an
effective research and education integration strategy to overcome this issue in one of the most
critical deeply-embedded systems, i.e., medical devices. Moreover, we present the results of two
years of implementation of the presented strategy at graduate-level through fault analysis attacks,
a variant of side-channel attacks. We note that the authors also supervise an undergraduate
student and the outcome of the presented work has been assessed for that student as well;
however, the emphasis is on graduate-level integration. The results of the presented work show
the success of the presented methodology while pinpointing the challenges encountered
compared to traditional embedded system security research/teaching integration of medical
devices security. We would like to emphasize that our integration approaches are general and
scalable to other critical infrastructures as well.

Introduction
Security and privacy of embedded systems have been center of attention in research and teaching
whose compromise has direct organizational, societal, and economical adverse effects.
Embedded systems in critical infrastructures, smart homes, smart fabrics, and similar smart
platforms need to be secure to transfer data in private manner. Medical devices, e.g., implantable
and wearable medical devices (IWMDs) which are commonly used for diagnosing, monitoring,
and treating various medical conditions, are among the most critical smart platforms. Similar to
other emerging usage models, a general trend is toward increased functional complexity and
connectivity, resulting in larger attack surface. The growing number of instances of security
breaches in the last few years in such extremely sensitive usage models has created a compelling
case for efforts towards securing such systems1,2,3,4,5,6, and refining new research and teaching
trends7, 8. Deeply-embedded systems such as medical devices will dominate the future of
traditional embedded systems and will likely get wide-spread adoption about 100 times more
compared to traditional desktops.
IWMDs are generally categorized into 16 groups by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA): anesthesiology; cardiovascular; clinical chemistry and clinical toxicology; dental; ear,
nose, and throat; gastroenterology and urology; general and plastic surgery; general hospital and
personal use; hematology and pathology; immunology and microbiology; neurology; obstetric

and gynaecologic; opthalmic; orthopedic; physical medicine; and radiology9. Many of such
devices are able to communicate through wireless means. These, unlike traditional embedded
systems, have three distinct characteristics, differentiating them from the traditional ones. First,
such IWMDs are embedded deeply into human bodies, e.g., cardiovascular defibrillators
embedded into human bodies which perform therapeutic tasks or Glucose Monitor and Insulin
Pump monitoring pairs which are used for diagnosis and therapy. A security breach here is lifethreatening and unlike traditional embedded systems such as smart cards in which financial loss
is the result of the breach, here, catastrophic and vitally-adverse problems are inevitable. Second,
they are already developed and in wide-spread use and any change to provide security would
require tremendous efforts. Third, the area/delay/power consumption and, in general, the
implementation and performance metrics of these devices cannot, in most of the cases, tolerate
the burden of the cryptographic algorithms used for traditional embedded systems. Specifically,
for both hardware through application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and fieldprogrammable gate arrays (FPGAs), and software through microcontrollers, the potential
unacceptable degradation of performance and implementation metrics is a meaningful concern
for medical devices security. For instance, if the security protection schemes for a pacemaker
(typically battery-powered to perform medical tasks for years) lead to its battery depletion in
months instead of years, the resulting secure device would be life-threatening and impractical.

Contributions
There have been previous efforts for integrating research and teaching in traditional systems;
nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, a practical solution and an effective assessment
strategy have not been adopted for emerging usage models integration such as IWMDs. Our
pedagogical hypothesis is that emerging security research (through cryptographic solutions) can
be integrated in university education considering three teaching and learning approaches; (a).
Developing a respective multi-disciplinary laboratory (engineering, mathematics, and
biomedicine in particular) for both research and teaching, (b). Advancing education through
inter- and intra-university research collaborations in the aforementioned fields, and (c).
Assessing the outcome through detailed benchmarks. The authors of this work are from different
and diverse backgrounds and have prior expertise in the topic proposed (both teaching and
research) and have been with world-known security and cryptography groups. This project is
addressing the respective tradeoffs between the IWMDs security levels and affording the
overheads. To meet this objective, we have used such methodology for two years in educating
graduate students and brought them very well up to speed which resulted in successful research
(publications in top-tier electrical and computer engineering IEEE Transactions journals for the
case study of fault analysis attacks).
The assessment strategy for the proposed integration is two-fold. A pilot project is developed
(through work of undergraduate and graduate students) for testing the pedagogy in three phases:
(a) education, (b) research, and (c) integration. The education phase takes into account the multidisciplinary aspects of the project and in the research phase, publishing through the outcomes of
the education phase is the priority. Security integration assessment is based on the resources in
the already-developed laboratory.
Programming languages, especially hardware description languages of cryptographic algorithms
developed in the courses, are used as final projects. The evaluation of success of integration of

research and teaching is performed by a group of research/teaching faculty members with diverse
departments. The results will be placed on the world-wide web for advancing global education
and with the aim of possible improvement from both research and education communities. The
eventual outcome of this integration is a step-forward to fill the current gap of emerging security
teaching/research integration for IWMDs.
We have had the following goals in such integration:
(a) Assess and benchmark the complications in IWMDs security and privacy;
(b) Evaluate co-design for hardware and software platforms teaching and research
integration. Indeed, in previous work, co-design architectures through symmetric key
block ciphers have been evaluated10, motion control robots have been implemented11, and
co-design education has been researched12);
(c) IWMDs, and in general, deeply-embedded systems security teaching and research
challenges and complications benchmark in practice through developing a respective
multi-disciplinary laboratory; and
(d) Rochester Institute of Technology-based collaboration as well as inter-university research
work for advancing education with respect to IWMDs security and privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related to IWMDs, we present topics needed for
cryptographic engineering research and teaching integration. Furthermore, the methodology for
integration is explained through a case study, covering both the challenges for the experimented
studies and the routes to dissolve them. Finally, we summarize the paper.

Essential (Sub)-Topics for Research/Teaching
It is known that there exist select resources specifically suitable for embedded systems security
education13, 14, nevertheless, medical devices (IWMDs) security challenges have not been subject
of specific readings for educational purposes, to the best of authors’ knowledge. To provide
select topics and sub-topics (the list includes select items but it does not confine the approach
and can be broadened) required for cryptographic engineering used for IWMDs security
research/teaching integration, we would like to first differentiate the materials used in embedded
security courses15, 16 and the ones specific to IWMDs. Table 1 presents select topics considered
in the integration process.
Because the main objective of this paper is integration of research and teaching related to
IWMDs security, we exclude the topics used for education purposes only and are not the results
of our prior research work. However, it is useful to note that a specific graduate or undergraduate
level course in IWMDs systems security (and thus a potential textbook) may have a number of
readings/chapters, i.e., the select topics in Table 1 in addition to, typically, an Introduction and a
Discussion. Level of readers in such course/reading needs to be taken into account
(undergraduate- or graduate-level, for instance) and, accordingly, needs to be tailored noting
different considerations including real-world examples for IWMDs (to encourage the students
and give them the context within different medical fields), references to the state-of-the-art
IWMDs security mechanisms and respective solutions (for undergraduate students, specifically,
to encourage graduate-level studies), platforms for hardware [ASIC/FPGA from different
vendors such as Xilinx/Altera/Synopsys tools, to name a few] and software (free-of-charge
platform tools for simulations/syntheses/implementations, for instance), to name a few.

Table 1. IWMDs security through cryptographic engineering research/teaching
integration topics
Select topics

Reliable design
of IWMDs

Cryptographic
solutions for
IWMDs

Side-channels
and
countermeasures

Case
studies

Risk assessment

Cryptographic
tools and
methodologies

Select sub-topics
•
•
•
•
•

Hardware and software architectures for IWMDs
Fault tolerance of IWMDs architectures
Design for test and reliability
Battery-power preservation
Dependability requirements

•
•
•

Cryptographic embedded processors and co-processors
Hardware accelerators for secure IWMDs
Efficient embedded software implementations

•

•

Side-channel attacks and countermeasures targeting
IWMDs
Fault attacks and countermeasures (considering
practical attacks for IWMDs hardware
implementations)
Power analysis and cache timing attacks

•
•

Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators
Microprocessor-Based Pacemaker Design

•
•
•
•

Battery power
Overhead tolerance
Efficiency measurement
Verification and safety

•
•
•

Metrics for the security of embedded systems
Secure programming techniques
FPGA design security (embedded hardware)

•
•

The Framework of Contextual Integrity
Trusted computing platforms deeply-embedded into
human body
Economics of IWMDs security and privacy
FDA-relevant policies, solutions, and benchmark

•

Applications
•
•

Fault Analysis Attacks: Integration of Research and Teaching
Implementation attacks which are based on retrieving secret information from an implemented
secure cryptographic algorithm are one of the major threats for such devices. In general, such
attacks could be based on active measures (in which the device is modified, i.e., through active
attacks, such as fault attacks; or through passive listening to the side-channels, such as power
analysis attacks. Specifically, in fault analysis attacks, faults are injected and information is
derived whereas in power analysis attacks, one would only listen to what is leaked, for example
power traces. To present the results of our IWMDs security teaching and research integration, we
have used “side-channel analysis attacks” as our topic. As mentioned, these are based on
information gained from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem (on hardware or
software), rather than brute force or theoretical weaknesses. As another example, cache timing
information can provide an extra source of information which can be exploited to break the
system.
The reason for selecting fault analysis attacks for providing our methodology is that, as seen in
Table 1, this topic is related to many other topics, allowing us to cover a large number of subtopics used for integration. Table 2 lists this relation (sub-topics are directly related whereas
related other topics are related indirectly).
Table 2. Related topics to side-channels.
Topic

Sub-topics
- Side-channel attacks and
countermeasures targeting
IWMDs

- Fault attacks and
Side-channels
countermeasures
and
countermeasures (considering practical
attacks for IWMDs
hardware implementations)
- Power analysis and cache
timing attacks

Related other topics
- Hardware architectures for IWMDs
- FPGA design security (embedded
hardware)
- Cryptography for IWMDs
- Reconfigurable hardware for cryptography
(embedded hardware)
- Trusted computing platforms deeplyembedded into human body

Main Step 1. Identifying the Education Challenges: Two of the authors supervise students
whose research focus is security and reliability (specifically fault diagnosis and tolerance in
hardware). Fault analysis attacks (active side-channel attacks) topic through fault injection has
been selected.
One of the main goals of this phase was to expose the challenges of IWMDs systems security
education as follows:
-

The first challenge was to find resources directly related to IWMDs security
education which is an emerging topic. Some important resources are: USENIX
Enigma conference (a new conference on emerging threats and novel attacks),

TROOPERS IT Security conference, U.S. House Cybersecurity Caucus, Health
Privacy & Security Forum, U.S. Senate Hearing on IRS Breach, FDA
Cybersecurity Workshop, NIST Information Security and Privacy Advisory
Board on medical device security, Association for the Advancement of Medical
Instrumentation Standards Week: Medical Device Security working group,
Healthcare Technology Research and Advisory Council Secure Health, and
Archimedes Medical Device Security Workshop.
-

The second challenge was that the topic chosen is, in nature, multi-disciplinary.
The expertise of authors in these topics helped filling the gap in cases where
students were not acquainted with the field of study. The instructors (authors of
this work) also consulted with faculty members from other departments
(especially computer science and mathematics) to meet the teaching objectives.

Main Step 2. Research and Development: Fault analysis is an active sub-variant for sidechannel attacks. In such implementation attacks, faults are injected maliciously (attackers want to
inject transient faults not to break the system, so their plan is intentionally injecting faults into
the architectures of crypto-systems to retrieve as much leaked sensitive information as possible).
With respect to IWMDs, for instance, a pacemaker containing an embedded hard processor, high
temperature, unsupported supply voltage or current, excessively high overclocking, strong
electric or magnetic fields, or ionizing radiation, are all the ways to assert faults to influence the
operation of the processor (here the processor is an ASIC architecture typically; yet, FPGAs
containing the designs of cryptographic algorithms can very similarly be attacked).
Let us divide the research and development into two parts. Fig. 1 presents different topics in
IWMDs security.
Computer and
Systems
Engineering

Human Factors

- Dependability, safety,
reliability, security, privacy
- Medical device malware
- Risk management

Regulatory Policy

- Clinical engineering

- Pre-market clearance and
approval processes

- Usable security

- FDA's Good Manufacturing
Practices

Figure 1. Different topics in IWMDs security.

Error control coding

Error injection
simulations

FPGA/ASIC
implementations

- CRC/parity/etc.

- LFSR-based injections

- Synopsys/ISE/Vivado

- Recomputing using encoded
operands

- Deriving false alarms and
detection ratios

- Performance and
implementation metrics

Figure 2. Sub-parts of the presented research scheme for integrating with teaching in this work.
Many error detection schemes have been proposed to defend against fault analysis attacks. We
have followed the teaching tasks as seen in the flowchart of Fig. 2, including three sub-parts: (a)
error control coding, (b) error injection simulations for error coverage derivation for
single/multiple stuck-at zero/one, and (c) FPGA/ASIC implementations to derive the overheads.
Finally, we have given three sub-cases to the students: (a) low-complexity block ciphers which
are more lightweight than the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), (b) public-key
cryptography with the case elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC), and (c) non-cryptography
computer arithmetic architectures (e.g., CORDIC and Viterbi algorithms) whose reliability
assurance is critical.
Main Step 3. Integration of Research and Teaching: For this step, we have built on the
research of a group of graduate students in the second phase during the academic years of 20132014 and 2014-2015.
Engaging students in non-traditional learning activities: For understanding the IWMDs
security, this step is pivotal. There are a number of sub-steps needed for this main step:
-

Asking students to read research papers (venues include both security and medical
domains) to explain the core of research on IWMDs security,
Contacting the authors of research papers, when needed, and
Conducting discussion sessions to share the learning materials and hard/soft skills

Comparison of traditional embedded security and IWMDs security: The second sub-step was to
contrast traditional embedded security and IWMDs security based on the differences between
these two. Fig. 3 shows the major differences taught to the students (IWMDs vs. traditional
embedded systems security). This is a step-forward towards integration of emerging
cryptographic engineering teaching and research.

Why IWMDs security is different?

Security differences
- Both privacy-wise and security-wise are very
sensitive compared to traditional systems. Here we
talk about life-threatening adverse effects.
- Security solutions for traditional embedded systems
may not be applicable or may not suffice.
- IWMDs and respective medical systems may have
transient usage patterns, where access
privileges need to be defined over time and space, not
just by the user.

Implementation
differences
- For IWMDs, it might be impractical for users to
explicitly perform system administration tasks such as
security patching, etc.
- Cryptographic solutions add much overhead and are
thus impractical.
- Danger of battery-depletion is far more than
traditional systems.

Figure 3. Traditional vs. IWMDs security (comparison for teaching and research integration).
Identifying the modularity of different cryptographic algorithms: These include algorithms
such as SHA3 and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The sub-step includes applying
fault diagnosis and tolerance techniques specified for IWMDs.
Fig. 4 shows the first part of an S-box structure for the Pomaranch cipher. The structure of
Pomaranch is based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) which allow fast implementation
and produce sequences with large period if the feedback polynomial is chosen appropriately
(often clock controlled for complexity induction and used in conjunction with “jumping” to
increase the efficiency and reach a CJCSG structure). The operations used in composite fields
include addition, multiplication (including multiplication with constant), squaring, cubing, and
inversion in GF(23). The architecture of the substitution box in Fig. 4 includes a first sub-part
which contains the transformation matrix M whose input is shown by X in GF(29) to get an
output of A in GF((23)3).
Composite fields can be utilized to realize the substitution box to achieve low-complexity
architectures. In Pomaranch, the two most and least significant bits are discarded to get to the
uneven structure of the substitution box of Pomaranch.

Figure 4. Hierarchy of the first part of an S-box structure for the Pomaranch cipher.

Educational Objectives:
-

-

Understanding the implementation platforms (hardware [ASIC/FPGA] or
software [microcontrollers]) through which the overheads were derived, this
objective is fulfilled by implementing the original and fault detection designs and
deriving the metrics overheads.
Refining soft skills including presentation of the results of IWMDs security
research (a) orally or (b) in writing, and decision-making.
Evaluating hard technical skills for simulations and implementations of the fault
diagnosis schemes for crypto-systems.

We already have a security laboratory and the security assessment is based on the resources in
the already-developed “Applied Cryptography” laboratory. The form of outcome of the
assessment will be mostly in programming languages specially hardware description languages
of cryptographic algorithms developed as final projects. It is worth mentioning that the authors
of this work have extensive background on fault detection and tolerance in many fields including
cryptography17-35. Moreover, in the fields of computer arithmetic and cryptographic engineering,
they have prior expertise36-50, as well as prior editorials of related special issues51-52.

Integration Problems for Teaching and Research of IWMDs
The problems, challenges, and complications during the course of the integration have been
resolved. In what follows, through three instances, we present some of them.
IWMDs and fault detection and tolerance with respect to cryptography have broad theory. This
includes time/hardware/hybrid redundancies. Books and readings as well as conference/journal
papers have been used for instruction of students. Nevertheless, we note that just trying random
faults will not be helpful in breaking most ciphers. As such, error detection approaches based on
recomputing with encoded operands for both transient and permanent faults can be used, for
instance, as a remedy. The attackers might use entropy-aware injections to bypass the solutions.
Through the research work done in 2013-2015, we refined the approaches to have specific
applicability to fault attacks.
Simulation-based assessments through single/multiple stuck-at zero/one, transient and permanent
faults are a major part of fault diagnosis and tolerance in cryptography. Single stuck-at fault
injection is usually done for assessing the effectiveness of the proposed fault diagnose methods.
Nevertheless, the injection locations depend on the specific problem to solve, e.g., Pomaranch,
Sha-3, or ECC architectures.
A challenge here is that the integration of research and teaching becomes very applicationspecific and dynamic with respect to error simulations. There are two methods, in general, for
assessing the fault coverage of the designs. The choice of hardware or software based injections
through C++ or LFSRs is an important step to take. These application specific choices make the
integration of “simulation” step as a number of general guidelines rather than specific schemes.
The complications in the implementation step usually relate to the ASIC and FPGA tools and
hardware. Specifically, for IWMDs, if ASIC is used as the hardware platform, Synopsys tools

are used for implementations to derive the metrics (Design Compiler, PrimeTime PX, and the
like). For FPGAs, Xilinx Vivado and Altera Quartus II are utilized.

Discussions and Conclusions
We have observed increased student engagement and deeper understanding through inquiry-led
learning of fundamentals of IWMDs security. Moreover, it certainly helped generating additional
research output/knowledge creation and strengthened pathways to postgraduate research (we are
currently working on a number of IEEE Transactions journal papers and related conference
papers as a result of such creation).
We also believe that linkage of research and teaching in academic work is beneficial for the
departments the authors are affiliated with. Students become knowledge workers and are engaged
in concept of the provisionality of existing knowledge. Overall, the students were satisfied with
the integration outcome and also their publications progress.
Data management has been a pivotal part of this integration, noting that the results are useful for
advancing global education and with the aim of possible improvement from both research and
education communities.
In this paper, for IWMDs security research and teaching integration, new methods considering
their complications are presented. We have presented the results of two years of implementing
the presented strategy at graduate-level through fault attacks of Pomaranch case study. The
results of the presented work show the success of the presented work while pinpointing the
challenges encountered compared to traditional embedded system security research/teaching
integration. We were successful in exposing the challenges of IWMDs security education
through working closely with a number of students in the areas of cryptographic engineering and
general reliability. Finally, inter- and intra-university research collaborations were initiated.
These help us towards future directions of such integration, e.g., post-quantum cryptography.
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